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A KINETIC EQUATION FOR ECONOMIC VALUE ESTIMATION
WITH IRRATIONALITY AND HERDING
BERTRAM DU¨RING, ANSGAR JU¨NGEL, AND LARA TRUSSARDI
Dedicated to Peter A. Markowich on the occasion of his 60th birthday
Abstract. A kinetic inhomogeneous Boltzmann-type equation is proposed to model the
dynamics of the number of agents in a large market depending on the estimated value
of an asset and the rationality of the agents. The interaction rules take into account
the interplay of the agents with sources of public information, herding phenomena, and
irrationality of the individuals. In the formal grazing collision limit, a nonlinear nonlocal
Fokker-Planck equation with anisotropic (or incomplete) diffusion is derived. The exis-
tence of global-in-time weak solutions to the Fokker-Planck initial-boundary-value problem
is proved. Numerical experiments for the Boltzmann equation highlight the importance
of the reliability of public information in the formation of bubbles and crashes. The use
of Bollinger bands in the simulations shows how herding may lead to strong trends with
low volatility of the asset prices, but eventually also to abrupt corrections.
1. Introduction
Herding behavior and the formation of speculative bubbles (and subsequent crashes) are
observed in many financial and commodity markets. There are many historical examples,
from the so-called Dutch tulip bulb mania in 1637 to the recent credit crunch in the US
housing market in 2007. Despite the obvious importance of these phenomena, herding
behavior and bubble formation were investigated in the scientific literature only in the
last two decades. The aim of this paper is to propose and investigate a kinetic model
describing irrationality and herding of market agents, motivated by the works of Toscani
[26] and Delitala and Lorenzi [13].
Herding in economic markets is characterized by a homogenization of the actions of the
market participants, which behave at a certain time in the same way. Herding may lead to
strong trends with low volatility of asset prices, but eventually also to abrupt corrections,
so it promotes the occurence of bubbles and crashes. Numerous socio-economic papers
[4, 8, 17, 23, 24] and research in biological sciences [1, 19] show that herding interactions
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play a crucial role in social scenarios. Herding behavior is driven by emotions and usually
occurs because of the social pressure of conformity. Another cause is the appeal to belief
that it is unlikey that a large number of people could be wrong. A market participant might
follow the herd in spite of another opinion. This phenomenon is known as an information
cascade [5].
While most approaches to herding in the literature are based on agent models, our
approach uses techniques from kinetic theory, similar to opinion-formation models [7, 15,
26]. These methods employ ideas from statistical mechanics to describe the behavior of a
large number of individuals in a society [22]. Binary collisions between gas molecules are
replaced by interactions of market individuals, and the phase-space variables are interpreted
as socio-economic variables, in our case: the rationality x ∈ R and the estimated asset value
w ∈ R+ := [0,∞), assigned to the asset by an individual. When x > 0, we say that the
agent behaves rational, otherwise irrational. We refer to the review [14] for a discussion of
rational herding models.
Denoting by f(x, w, t) the distribution of the agents at time t ≥ 0, its time evolution is
given by the inhomogenous Boltzmann-type equation
(1) ∂tf + (Φ(x, w)f)x = Q˜I(f) + Q˜H(f, f), (x, w) ∈ R× R
+, t > 0,
with the boundary condition f = 0 at w = 0 and initial condition f = f0 at t = 0. The
first term on the right-hand side describes an interaction that is soley based on economic
fundamentals. After the interaction, the individuals change their estimated asset value
influenced by sources of public information such as financial reports, balance sheet numbers,
etc. The second term describes binary interactions of the agents modeling the exchange of
information and possibly leading to herding and imitation phenomena.
When the asset value lies within a certain range around the “fair” prize, determined
by fundamentals, the agents may suffer from psychological biases like overconfidence and
limited attention [21], and we assume that they behave more irrational. This means that
the drift field Φ(x, w) is negative in that range. When the asset value becomes too low
or too large compared to the “fair” prize the asset values are believed to be driven by
speculation. We assume that the market agents recognize this fact at a certain point and
are becoming more rational. In this case, the drift field Φ(x, w) is positive. We expect
that the estimated asset value will in average be not too far from the “fair” price, and
we confirm this expectation by computing the moment of f(x, w, t) with respect to w in
Section 2.2. For details on the modeling, we refer to Section 2.
Our setting is influenced by the models investigated by Toscani [26] and Delitala and
Lorenzi [13]. Toscani [26] described the interaction of individuals in the context of opinion
formation. Our modeling of public information and herding is similar to [26]. The idea
to include public information and herding is due to [13]. In contrast to [13], we allow
for the drift field Φ(x, w), leading to the inhomogeneous Boltzmann-type equation (1).
Such equations were also studied in [16] but using a different drift field. The relationship
of rational herd behavior and asset values was investigated in [3] but no dynamics were
analyzed. The novelty of the present work is the combination of dynamics, transport,
public information, and herding.
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Our main results are as follows. We derive formally in the grazing collision limit (as in
[26]) the nonlinear Fokker-Planck equation
∂tg + (Φ(x, w)g)x = (K[g]g)w + (H(w)g)w + (D(w)g)ww,(2)
g(x, 0, t) = 0, g(x, w, 0) = g0(x, w), (x, w) ∈ R× R
+, t > 0.(3)
Here, K[g] is a nonlocal operator related to the attitude of the agents to change their mind
because of herding mechanisms, H(w) is an average of the compromise propensity, and
D(w) models diffusion, which can be interpreted as a self-thinking process, and satisfies
D(0) = 0. Again, we refer to Section 2 for details. A different herding diffusion model in the
context of crowd motion was derived and analyzed in [9]. Other kinetic and macroscopic
crowd models were considered in [12].
Equation (2) is nonlinear, nonlocal, degenerate in w, and anisotropic in x (incomplete
diffusion). It is well known that partial diffusion may lead to singularity formation [20],
and often the existence of solutions can be shown only in the class of very weak or entropy
solutions [2, 18]. Our situation is better than in [2, 18], since the transport in x is linear.
Exploiting the linear structure, we prove the existence of global weak solutions to (2)-(3).
However, we need the assumption that D(w) is strictly positive to get rid of the degeneracy
in w. Unfortunately, our estimates depend on infD(w) and become useless when D(0) = 0.
Finally, we present some numerical experiments for the inhomogeneous Boltzmann-type
equation (1) using a splitting scheme. The collisional part (i.e. (1) with Φ = 0) is approx-
imated using the interaction rules and a modified Bird scheme. The transport part (i.e.
(1) with Q˜I = Q˜H = 0) is discretized using a combination of an upwind and Lax-Wendroff
scheme. The numerical experiments highlight the importance of the reliability of public
information in the formation of bubbles and crashes. The use of Bollinger bands in the
simulations shows how herding may lead to strong trends with low volatility of the asset
prices, but eventually also to abrupt corrections.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the kinetic model is detailed and the
grazing collision limit is performed. The resulting Fokker-Planck model (2)-(3) is analyzed
in Section 3. Furthermore, we discuss the time evolution of the moments of g(x, w, t) in
some specific examples. The numerical results are presented in Section 4.
2. Modeling
The aim of this section is to model the evolution of the distribution of the number of agents
in a large market using a kinetic approach.
2.1. Public information and herding. We describe the behavior of the market agents
by means of microscopic interactions among the agents. The state of the market is assumed
to be characterized by two continuous variables: the estimated asset value w ∈ R+ :=
[0,∞) and the rationality x ∈ R. We say that the agent has a rational behavior if x > 0
and an irrational behavior if x < 0. The changes in asset valuation are based on binary
interactions. We take into account two different types: the interaction with public sources,
which characterizes a rational agent, and the effect of herding, characterizing an irrational
agent. In the following, we define the corresponding interaction rules.
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Let w be the estimated asset value of an arbitrary agent before the interaction and w∗
the asset value after exchanging information with the public source. Given the background
W = W (t), which may be interpreted as a “fair” value, the interaction is given, similarly
as in [10], by
(4) w∗ = w − αP (|w −W |)(w −W ) + ηd(w).
The function P measures the compromise propensity and takes values in [0, 1], and the
parameter α > 0 is a measure of the strength of this effect. Furthermore, the function d
with values in [0, 1] describes the modification of the asset value due to diffusion, and η is
a random variable with distribution µ with variance σ2I and zero mean taking values on R,
i.e. 〈w〉 =
∫
R
wdµ(w) = 0 and 〈w2〉 =
∫
R
w2dµ(w) = σ2I . An example for P is [26]
P (|w −W |) = 1{|w−W |<r},
where r > 0 and 1A denotes the characteristic function on the set A. Thus, if the estimated
asset value is too far from the value available from public sources (the “fair” value), the
effect of public information will be discarded (selective perception). The idea behind (4)
is that if a market agent trusts an information source, she will update her estimated asset
value to make it closer to the one suggested by the public information. We expect that a
rational investor follows such a strategy.
The interaction rule (4) has to ensure that the post-interaction value w∗ remains in the
interval R+. We have to require that diffusion vanishes at the border w = 0, i.e. d(0) = 0.
In the absence of diffusion, it follows that w∗ = w−αP (|w−W |)(w−W ) ≥ w−α(w−W ) =
(1 − α)w + αW ≥ 0 if w > W and w∗ = w + αP (|w −W |)(W − w) ≥ w ≥ 0 if w ≤ W .
Therefore, the post-interaction value w∗ stays in the domain R+.
The second interaction rule aims to model the effect of herding, i.e., we take into account
the interaction between a market agent and other investors. We suggest the interaction
rule, similarly as in [26],
(5)
w∗ = w − βγ(v, w)(w − v) + η1d(w),
v∗ = v − βγ(v, w)(v − w) + η2d(v).
The pairs (w, v) and (w∗, v∗) denote the asset values of two arbitrary agents before and
after the interaction, respectively. In (5), β ∈ (0, 1/2] is a constant which measures the
attitude of the market participants to change their mind because of herding mechanisms.
Furthermore, η1, η2 are random variables, modeling diffusion effects, with the same dis-
tribution with variance σ2H and zero mean, and, to simplify, the function d is the same
as in (4). The function γ with values in [0, 1] describes a socio-economic scenario where
individuals are highly confident in the asset. An example, taken from [13], reads as
(6) γ(v, w) = 1{w<v}vf(w),
where f is nonincreasing, f(0) = 1, and limw→∞ f(w) = 0. If an agent has an asset value
w smaller than v, the function γ will push this agent to assume a higher value w∗ than
that one before the interaction. This means that the agent trusts other agents that assign
a higher value. If w is larger than v, the agent hesitates to lower his asset value and
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nothing changes. Agents that assign a small value w tend to herd with a higher rate, i.e.
f is nonincreasing. Another choice is given by γ(v, w) = 1{|w−v|<rH} [13]. In this case, the
interaction occurs only when the two interacting agents have asset values which are not
too different from each other.
The interaction does not take place if w∗, v∗ are negative. In the absence of diffusion,
adding both equations in (5) gives w∗+ v∗ = v+w which means that the total momentum
is conserved. Subtracting both equations in (5) yields w∗ − v∗ = (1 − 2βγ(v, w))(w − v).
Since 1 − 2βγ(v, w) ∈ [0, 1) (observe that 0 < β ≤ 1/2), the post-interaction difference
w∗ − v∗ in the asset values is smaller than the pre-interaction difference w − v. We infer
that w∗, v∗ remain nonnegative.
When diffusion is taken into account, we need to specify the range of values the random
variables η1, η2 in (5) can assume. This clearly depends on the choice of d(w), and we refer
to [15, page 3691] for a more detailed discussion.
2.2. The kinetic equation. Instead of calculating the value x and w for each market
agent, we prefer to investigate the evolution of the distribution f(x, w, t) of the estimated
value and the rationality of the market participants. The integral
∫
B
f(x, w, t)dz with
z = (x, w) represents the number of agents with asset value and rationality in B ⊂ R×R+
at time t ≥ 0. In analogy with classical kinetic theory of rarefied gases, we may identify the
position variable with the rationality and the velocity with the asset value. Using standard
methods of kinetic theory, f(x, w, t) evolves according to the inhomogeneous Boltzmann
equation
(7) ∂tf + (Φ(x, w)f)x =
1
τI
QI(f) +
1
τH
QH(f, f), (x, w) ∈ R× R
+, t > 0.
Here, Φ(x, w) is the drift term, QI and QH are interaction integrals modeling the public
information and herding, respectively, and 1/τI > 0, 1/τH > 0 describe the interaction fre-
quencies. This equation is supplemented by the boundary condition f(x, 0, t) = 0 (nobody
believes that the asset has value zero) and the initial condition f(x, w, 0) = f0(x, w) for
(x, w) ∈ R× R+.
A simple model for Φ can be introduced as follows. If an agent gives an asset value that is
much larger than the “fair” value W , she will recognize that the value is overestimated and
it is believed that she will become more rational. The same holds true when the estimated
value is too low compared to W . In this regime, the drift function Φ(x, w) should be
positive since agents drift towards higher rationality x > 0. When the estimated value is
not too far from the value W , agents may behave more irrational and drift towards the
region x < 0, so the drift function is negative. An example for such a function is
(8) Φ(x, w) =
{
−δκ for |w −W | < R,
κ for |w −W | ≥ R,
where δ, κ, R > 0. The constant R fixes the range |w −W | < R in which bubbles and
crashes do not occur. More realistic models are obtained when R depends on time, and
we consider such a case in Section 4). An alternative is to employ the mean asset value∫
R
∫
R+
fwdwdx instead of w in |w −W | < R to distinguish the ranges.
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Next, we detail the choice of the interaction integrals. As pointed out in [10], the
existence of a pre-interaction pair which returns the post-interaction pair (w∗, v∗) through
an interaction of the type (4) is not guaranteed, because of the boundary constraint.
Therefore, we will give the interaction rule in the weak form. Let φ(w) := φ(x, w) be a
regular test function and set Ω = R× R+, z = (x, w). The weak form reads as
(9)
∫
Ω
QI(f)φ(w)dz =
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(
φ(w∗)− φ(w)
)
M(W )f(x, w, t)dzdW
〉
,
where 〈·〉 is the expectation value with respect to the random variable η in (4) andM(W ) ≥
0 represents the fixed background satisfying
∫
R+
M(W )dW = 1. The Boltzmann equation
for this operator, ∂tf = QI(f)/τI , becomes in the weak form
∂t
∫
Ω
f(x, w, t)φ(w)dz =
1
τI
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(
φ(w∗)− φ(w)
)
M(W )f(x, w, t)dzdW
〉
.
Choosing φ(w) = 1, the right-hand side vanishes, which expresses conservation of the
number of agents:
∂t
∫
Ω
f(x, w, t)dz = 0.
The choice φ(w) = w gives the time evolution of the mean asset value mw(f) =
∫
Ω
fwdz:
∂tmw(f) =
1
τI
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(w∗ − w)M(W )f(x, w, t)dzdW
〉
= −α
∫
Ω
H(w)f(x, w, t)dz,
where
(10) H(w) =
1
τI
∫
R+
P (|w −W |)(w −W )M(W )dW.
For instance, if P = 1 and denoting by ρ :=
∫
Ω
fdz the (conserved) number of agents, we
obtain H(w) = τ−1I (w −M), where M :=
∫∞
0
WM(W )dW , and
∂tmw(f) = −
α
τI
∫
Ω
(w −M)f(x, w, t)dz = −
α
τI
mw(f) +
α
τI
ρM.
This shows that the mean asset value converges exponentially fast to the mean value of
the background as t→∞.
The operator QH(f, f) models the binary interaction of the agents and, similary as in
[26], we define
(11)
∫
Ω
QH(f, f)φ(w)dz =
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(
φ(w∗)− φ(w)
)
f(x, w, t)f(x, v, t)dzdv
〉
,
where (w, v) is the pre-interaction pair that generates via (5) the post-interaction pair
(w∗, v∗). Choosing φ = 1 in the Boltzmann equation ∂tf = QH(f, f), we see that this
operator also conserves the number of agents. Taking φ(w) = w and using a symmetry
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argument, the interaction rule (5), and the fact that the random variables η1 and η2 have
zero mean, we find that
∂tmw(f) =
1
τH
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(w∗ − w)f(x, w, t)f(x, v, t)dzdv
〉
=
1
2τH
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(v∗ + w∗ − v − w)f(x, w, t)f(x, v, t)dzdv
〉
=
1
2τH
〈∫
R+
∫
Ω
(
η1d(w) + η2d(v)
)
f(x, w, t)f(x, v, t)dzdv
〉
= 0,
We infer that herding conserves the mean asset value. This is reasonable as the crowd may
tend to any direction depending on the herding.
2.3. Grazing collision limit. The analysis of the Boltzmann equation (7) is rather in-
volved, and it is common in kinetic theory to investigate certain asymptotics leading
to simplified models of Fokker-Planck type. Our aim is to perform the formal limit
(α, β, σ2H, σ
2
I ) → 0 (in a certain sense made precise below), where α, β appear in the
interaction rules (4) and (5) and σ2H , σ
2
I are the variances of the random variables in these
rules. The limit can be made rigorous using the techniques of [11, 26], but we prefer to
consider the formal limit only. In the following, we proceed along the lines of [11, 26].
Set k = β/α, ts = αt, xs = αx, and introduce the functions g(xs, w, ts) = f(x, w, t)
Φs(xs, w) = Φ(x, w). After the change of variables (x, w) 7→ (xs, ts) and setting zs =
(xs, w), the weak form of (7) reads as
∂
∂ts
∫
Ω
g(xs, w, ts)φ(w)dzs +
∫
Ω
∂
∂xs
(
Φs(xs, w)g(xs, w, ts)
)
φ(w)dzs
=
1
ατI
∫
Ω
QI,s(g)φ(w)dzs +
1
ατH
∫
Ω
QH,s(g, g)φ(w)dzs,(12)
where QI,s(g) = QI(f), QH,s(g, g) = QH(f, f) are defined in weak form in (9), (11),
respectively. In the following, we omit the index s.
Before performing the formal grazing collision limit, we rewrite the first term on the
right-hand side of (12). By a Taylor expansion and the interaction rule (4), we can write
φ(w∗)− φ(w) = φ′(w)(w∗ − w) +
1
2
φ′′(w˜)(w∗ − w)2
= φ′(w)
(
− αP (|w −W |)(w −W ) + ηd(w)
)
+
1
2
φ′′(w˜)
(
− αP (|w −W |)(w −W ) + ηd(w)
)2
,
where w˜ = θw∗+ (1− θ)w for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Inserting this expression into (9), observing
that 〈η〉 = 0, 〈η2〉 = σ2I , and taking into account definition (10) for H(w), it follows that
1
ατI
∫
Ω
QI(g)φ(w)dz = −
1
τI
∫
R+
∫
Ω
φ′(w)P (|w −W |)(w −W )M(W )g(x, w, t)dzdW
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+
1
2τI
∫
R+
∫
Ω
φ′′(w˜)
(
αP (|w −W |)2(w −W )2 +
σ2I
α
d(w)2
)
M(W )g(x, w, t)dzdW
= −
1
τI
∫
Ω
φ′(w)H(w)g(x, w, t)dz +R(α, σI)
+
1
2τI
∫
R+
∫
Ω
φ′′(w)
(
αP (|w −W |)2(w −W )2 +
σ2I
α
d(w)2
)
M(W )g(x, w, t)dzdW,
where
R(α, σI) =
1
2τI
∫
R+
∫
Ω
(
φ′′(w˜)− φ′′(w)
)(
αP (|w −W |)2(w −W )2 +
σ2I
α
d(w)2
)
×M(W )g(x, w, t)dzdW.
We wish to pass to the limit α→ 0 and σI → 0 such that λI := σ
2
I/α is fixed. It is proved
in [26, Section 4.1] that R(α, σI)→ 0 as (α, σI)→ 0. Then
lim
(α,σI )→0
1
ατI
∫
Ω
QI(g)φ(w)dz =
1
τI
∫
Ω
(
− φ′(w)H(w) +
λI
2
d(w)2φ′′(w)
)
g(x, w, t)dz
=
∫
Ω
(
(H(w)g)w +
λI
2τI
(d(w)2g)ww
)
φ(w)dz,
where in the last step we integrated by parts. The boundary integrals vanish since g = 0
at w = 0 and d(0) = 0 imply that (d(w)2g)w|w=0 = d
′(0)g|w=0 + d(0)gw|w=0 = 0.
The limit (α, σH) → 0 in the last term of (12) is performed in a similar way. Using a
Taylor expansion and (5), we have (with a different w˜ as above)
φ(w∗)− φ(w) = φ′(w)
(
− αkγ(v, w)(v − w) + η1d(w)
)
+
1
2
φ′′(w˜)
(
− αkγ(v, w)(v − w) + η1d(w)
)2
.
We insert this expansion into (11) and find that
1
ατH
∫
Ω
QH(g, g)dz =
1
τH
∫
R+
∫
Ω
(
− kγ(v, w)(v − w)φ′(w)
+
1
2
(
αk2γ(v, w)2(v − w)2 +
σ2H
α
d(w)2
)
φ′′(w)
)
g(x, v, t)g(x, w, t)dzdv
=
∫
Ω
(
−K[g](x, w, t)φ′(w) +
σ2H
2ατH
d(w)2ρφ′′(w)
)
g(x, w, t)dz
+
αk2
2τH
∫
R+
∫
Ω
γ(v, w)2(v − w)2g(x, v, t)g(x, w, t)φ′′(w)dzdw,
where we recall that ρ =
∫
Ω
fdz and we have set
K[g](x, w, t) =
k
τH
∫ ∞
0
γ(v, w)(v.w)g(x, v, t)dv.
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Keeping λH = σ
2
H/α fixed, the limit (α, σH)→ 0 leads to
lim
(α,σH )→0
1
ατH
∫
Ω
QH(g, g)dz =
∫
Ω
(
−K[g](x, w, t)φ′(w) +
λH
2τH
d(w)2ρφ′′(w)
)
g(x, w, t)dz
=
∫
Ω
(
(K[g]g)w +
λHρ
2τH
(d(w)2g)ww
)
φ(w)dz.
Therefore, the limit (α, σI , σH)→ 0 in (12) gives∫
Ω
(
∂tg + (Φ(x, w)g)x
)
φdz =
∫
Ω
(
(H(w)g)w + (K[g]g)w
+
1
2
(
λI
τI
+
λHρ
τH
)
(d(w)2g)ww
)
φdz.
Since φ is an arbitrary test function, this is the weak form of the Fokker-Planck-type
equation
(13) ∂tg + (Φ(x, w)g)x = (K[g]g +H(w))w +
1
2
(
λI
τI
+
λHρ
τH
)
(d(w)2g)ww
for (x, w) ∈ R × R+, t > 0. This equation is supplemented by the boundary condition
g = 0 at w = 0 and the initial condition g(0) = g0 in Ω.
3. Analysis
The aim of this section is to analyze the Fokker-Planck-type equation derived in the pre-
vious section. To this end, we set
Γ(v, w) :=
k
τH
γ(v, w)(v − w), D(w) :=
1
2
(
λI
τI
+
λHρ
τH
)
d(w)2.
Then (13) simplifies to
(14) ∂tg + (Φ(x, w)g)x = (K[g]g +H(w)g)w + (D(w)g)ww, K[g] =
∫ ∞
0
Γ(v, w)g(v)dv.
3.1. Existence of weak solutions. We wish to show the existence of weak solutions to
(3), (14) under the following hypotheses:
H1: Φ ∈ W 2,∞(Ω), H ∈ W 1,∞(R+), D ∈ W 2,∞(R+), and there exists δ > 0 such that
D(w) ≥ δ > 0 for w ∈ (0,∞).
H2: Γ ∈ L2((R+)2), Γ ≥ 0, and Γw(v, w) ≤ 0 for all v, w ≥ 0.
H3: g0 ∈ H
1(0,∞) and 0 ≤ g0 ≤M0 for some M0 > 0.
Then the main result reads as follows.
Theorem 1. Let Hypotheses H1-H3 hold. Then there exists a weak solution g to (2)-(3)
satisfying 0 ≤ g(x, w, t) ≤ M0e
λt for (x, w) ∈ Ω, t > 0, where λ > 0 depends on Φ, H and
D, and it holds g ∈ L2(0, T ;H1(Ω)), ∂tg ∈ L
2(0, T ;H1(Ω)′).
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The idea of the proof is to regularize equation (2) by adding a second-order derivative
with respect to x, to truncate the nonlinearity, and to solve the equation in the finite
interval w ∈ (0, R). Then we pass to the deregularization limit. Let R > 0, 0 < ε < 1,
M > 0, set
KM [g](x, w, t) =
∫ R
0
Γ(v, w)(g)M(x, v, t)dv, (g)M = max{0,min{M, g}},
where g is an integrable function, and introduce ΩR = (−R,R) × (0, R). We split the
boundary ∂ΩR = ∂ΩD ∪ ∂ΩN into two parts: ∂ΩD = {(x, w) : x ∈ [−R,R], w = 0, R}
and ∂ΩN = {(x, w) : x = ±R, w ∈ (0, R)}. Finally, we set g
+ = max{0, g}. Consider the
approximated nonlinear problem
∂tg + (Φ(x, w)g
+)x =
(
(KM [g] +H(w) +D
′(w))g+
)
w
+ (D(w)gw)w + εgxx,(15)
g = 0 on ∂ΩD , gx = 0 on ∂ΩN , g(x, w, 0) = 0 in ΩR.(16)
We introduce the space H1D(ΩR) consisting of those functions v ∈ H
1(ΩR) which satisfy
v = 0 on ∂ΩD, and we set H
−1
D (ΩR) = (H
1
D(ΩR))
′.
The weak formulation of (15)-(16) reads as: For all v ∈ L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)),∫ T
0
〈∂tg, v〉dt = −
∫ T
0
∫
ΩR
(
(Φx(x, w)g
+ + Φ(x, w)g+x )v(17)
+
(
KM [g] +H(w) +D
′(w)
)
g+vw + d(w)gwvw + εgxvx
)
dzdt,
where 〈·, ·〉 is the dual product between H−1D (ΩR) and H
1
D(ΩR).
Proof of Theorem 1. We wish to apply the Leray-Schauder fixed-point theorem. For this,
we split the proof in several steps.
Step 1: solution of the linearized problem. Let T > 0, g˜ ∈ L2(0, T ;L2(Ω)), and η ∈ [0, 1].
We introduce the forms
a(g, v) =
∫
ΩR
(
ηΦ(x, w)gxv +D(w)gwvw + εgxvx
)
dz, g, v ∈ H1D(ΩR),(18)
F (v) = −η
∫
ΩR
(
Φx(x, w)g˜
+v + (KM [g˜] +H(w) +D
′(w))g˜+vw
)
dz.(19)
Since KM [g˜] is bounded, it is not difficult to see that a is bilinear and continuous on
H1D(ΩR)
2 and F is linear and continuous on H1D(ΩR). Furthermore, using Young’s inequal-
ity and D(w) ≥ δ > 0, it follows that, for some Cε > 0,
a(g, g) ≥
1
2
∫
ΩR
(
δg2wdz + ε(g
2
x + g
2)
)
dz − (Cε + ε)
∫
ΩR
g2dz
≥ min{δ, ε}‖g‖2H1(ΩR) − (Cε + ε)‖g‖
2
L2(ΩR)
.
By Corollary 23.26 in [27], there exists a unique solution g ∈ L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)) ∩H
1(0, T ;
H−1D (ΩR)) to
(20) 〈∂tg, v〉+ a(g, v) = F (v), t > 0, g(0) = ηg0.
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This defines the fixed-point operator S : L2(0, T ;L2(ΩR)) × [0, 1] → L
2(0, T ;L2(ΩR)),
S(g˜, η) = g, where g solves (20). This operator satisfies S(g˜, 0) = 0. Standard ar-
guments show that S is continuous (employing H1 estimates depending on ε). Since
L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)) ∩ H
1(0, T ; H−1D (ΩR)) is compactly embedded in L
2(0, T ;L2(ΩR)), the
operator is also compact. In order to apply the fixed-point theorem of Leray-Schauder, we
need to show uniform estimates.
Step 2: L∞ bound. Let g be a fixed point of S(·, η), i.e., g solves (20) with g˜ = g. We
choose v = g− := min{0, g} ∈ L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)) as a test function in (20) and integrate
over (0, t). Since g+g− = 0 and g−(0) = g−0 = 0, we have
a(g, g−) =
∫
ΩR
(
D(w)(g−w )
2 + ε(g−x )
2
)
dz ≥ 0, F (g−) = 0,
which shows that
1
2
∫
ΩR
g−(t)2dz =
1
2
∫
ΩR
g−(0)2dz −
∫ t
0
a(g, g−)ds ≤ 0.
This yields g− = 0 and g ≥ 0 in ΩR, t > 0. In particular, we may write g instead of g
+ in
(18)-(19).
For the upper bound, we choose the test function v = (g −M)+ ∈ L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)) in
(17), where M = M0e
λt for some λ > 0 which will be determined later. By Hypothesis
H3, (g −M)+(0) = (g0 −M0)
+ = 0. Observing that ∂tM = λM , (g −M)(g −M)
+
w =
1
2
[((g−M)+)2]w and integrating by parts in the integrals involving KM [g]+H(w)+D
′(w),
we find that
1
2
∫
ΩR
(g −M)+(t)2dz = −λ
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
M(g −M)+dzds
− η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
Φx(x, w)((g −M) +M) + Φ(x, w)(g −M)
+
x
)
(g −M)+dzds
− η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(KM [g] +H(w) +D
′(w))((g −M) +M)(g −M)+wdzds
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
D(w)((g −M)+w)
2 + ε((g −M)+x )
2
)
dzds
= −η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(Φx(x, w) + λ)M(g −M)
+dzds− η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
Φx(x, w)((g −M)
+)2dzds
− η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
Φ(x, w)(g −M)+x (g −M)
+dzds
+
η
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
KM [g]w +H
′(w) +D′′(w)
)
((g −M)+)2dzds
+ η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
KM [g]w +H
′(w) +D′′(w)
)
M(g −M)+dzds
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−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
D(w)((g −M)+w)
2 + ε((g −M)+x )
2
)
dzds.
The third integral on the right-hand side can be estimated by Young’s inequality,
−η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
Φ(x, w)(g −M)+x (g −M)
+dzds ≤
η
2ε
‖Φ‖2L∞(Ω)
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
((g −M)+)2dzds
+
ε
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
((g −M)+x )
2dzds.
Then, collecting the integrals involving M(g −M)+ and ((g −M)+)2 and observing that
Γw ≤ 0 implies that KM [g]w ≤ 0, it follows that
1
2
∫
ΩR
(g −M)+(t)2dz ≤ η
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
− Φx(x, w) +H
′(w) +D′′(w)− λ
)
M(g −M)+dzds
+
η
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
1
ε
‖Φ‖2L∞(Ω) − 2Φx(x, w) +H
′(w) +D′′(w)
)
((g −M)+)2dzds
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
D(w)((g −M)+w)
2 +
ε
2
((g −M)+x )
2
)
dzds.
Choosing λ ≥ ‖Φx‖L∞(Ω) + ‖H
′‖L∞(0,∞)+ ‖D
′′‖L∞(0,∞), the first integral on the right-hand
side is nonpositive. The last integral is nonpositive too, and the second integral can be
estimated by some constant Cε > 0. We conclude that∫
ΩR
(g −M)+(t)2dz ≤ Cε
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
((g −M)+)2dzds.
Then Gronwall’s lemma implies that (g−M)+ = 0 and g ≤M in ΩR, t > 0. In particular,
we can write K[g] instead of KM [g] in (17).
The L∞ bound provides the desired bound for the fixed-point operator in L2(0, T ;
L2(ΩR)), yielding the existence of a weak solution to (17).
Step 3: uniform H1 bound. We wish to derive H1 bounds independent of ε. To this
end, we choose first the test function v = g ∈ L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)) in (17) (replacing T by
t ∈ (0, T )):
1
2
∫
ΩR
g(t)2dz = −
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
Φx(x, w)g
2dzds−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
Φ(x, w)gxgdzds
−
1
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
K[g] +H(w) +D′(w)
)
(g2)wdzds
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
D(w)g2w + εg
2
x
)
dzds +
1
2
∫
ΩR
g20dz.
Applying Young’s inequality to the second integral on the right-hand side, integrating by
parts in the third integral, and observing that g = 0 at w ∈ {0, R} yields, for some constant
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C1 > 0 which depends on the L
∞ norms of Φx, H
′, and D′′ (we use again that K[g]w ≤ 0),
1
2
∫
ΩR
g(t)2dzdt ≤ C1
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
g2dzds+ C1
∫ T
0
∫
ΩR
g2xdzds(21)
−
∫ T
0
∫
ΩR
(
δg2w + εg
2
x
)
dzds +
1
2
∫
ΩR
g20dz.
Since C1 > ε is possible, this does not give an estimate, and we need a further argument.
Next, we differentiate (15) with respect to x in the sense of distributions and set h := gx:
∂th+
(
Φx(x, w)g + Φ(x, w)h
)
x
= (K[h]g)w +
(
(K[g] +H(w) +D′(w))h
)
w
(22)
+ (D(w)hw)w + εhxx in ΩR, t > 0.
We observe that the boundary condition g = 0 on ∂ΩD implies that also gx = 0 holds on
∂ΩD and so, gx = 0 on ∂ΩR. Hence, equation (22) is complemented with homogeneous
Dirichlet boundary conditions. Furthermore, h(x, w, 0) = g0,x(x, w). The weak formulation
of (22) reads as∫ T
0
〈∂th, v〉dt = −
∫ T
0
∫
ΩR
((
Φxx(x, w)g + 2Φx(x, w)h+ Φ(x, w)hx
)
v
+K[h]gvw +
(
K[g] +H(w) +D′(w)
)
hvw +D(w)hwvw + εhxvx
)
dzdt
for all v ∈ L2(0, T ;H10(ΩR)). This is a linear nonlocal problem for h, with given g, and we
verify that there exists a solution h ∈ L2(0, T ;H10(ΩR))∩H
1(0, T ;H−1(ΩR)), using similar
arguments as above. Therefore, we can choose v = h as a test function in (22):
1
2
∫
ΩR
h(t)2dz = −
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
(Φxx(x, w)gh+ 2Φx(x, w)h
2 +
1
2
Φ(x, w)(h2)x
)
dzds
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
K[h]ghw +
1
2
(
K[g] +H(w) +D′(w)
)
(h2)w +D(w)h
2
w + εh
2
x
)
dzds
+
1
2
∫
ΩR
gx(0)
2dz.
We integrate by parts and employ the inequalities K[g]w ≤ 0, D(w) ≥ δ:
1
2
∫
ΩR
h(t)2dzds ≤ −
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
Φxx(x, w)gh+
3
2
Φx(x, w)h
2
)
dzds
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
K[h]ghwdzds +
1
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
H ′(w) +D′′(w)
)
h2dzds(23)
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
δh2w + εh
2
x
)
dzds+
1
2
∫
ΩR
gx(0)
2dz.
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The first integral on the right-hand side is estimated by using Young’s inequality:∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
Φxx(x, w)gh+
3
2
Φx(x, w)h
2
)
dzds ≤
1
2
‖Φxx‖L∞(Ω)
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(g2 + h2)dzds
+
3
2
‖Φx‖L∞(Ω)
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
h2dzds.
For the second integral on the right-hand side of (23), we observe that 0 ≤ g ≤ M and
‖K[h]‖L2(ΩR) ≤ CΓ‖h‖L2(ΩR), where C
2
Γ =
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
Γ(v, w)2dvdw. Thus,
−
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
K[h]ghwdzds ≤M
∫ t
0
‖h‖L2(ΩR)‖hw‖L2(ΩR)ds
≤
δ
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
h2wdzds+
M
2δ
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
h2dzds.
This shows that, for some C2(δ) > 0,
1
2
∫
ΩR
h(t)2dz ≤ C2(δ)
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(g2 + h2)dzds−
δ
2
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
h2wdzds
− ε
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
h2xdzds+
1
2
∫
ΩR
gx(0)
2dz.(24)
We add (21) and (24) to find that, for some C3(δ) > 0,∫
ΩR
(g2 + h2)(t)dz +
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(
δg2w + εh
2 + εh2x
)
dzds ≤ C3(δ)
∫ t
0
∫
ΩR
(g2 + h2)dzds
+
1
2
∫
ΩR
(g20 + g
2
0,x)dz.
Gronwall’s lemma provides uniform estimates for g and gx = h:
(25) ‖g‖L∞(0,T ;L2(ΩR)) + ‖gx‖L∞(0,T ;L2(ΩR)) + ‖gw‖L2(0,T ;L2(ΩR)) ≤ C,
where C > 0 depends on δ, M , and the L∞ bounds for Φ, H , D′ and their derivatives, but
not on R and ε.
Step 4: limit ε → 0. We wish to pass to the limit ε → 0 in (15). Let gε := g be a
solution to (15)-(16) with K[g] = KM [g]. First, we estimate ∂tgε:
‖∂tgε‖L2(0,T ;H−1
D
(ΩR))
≤ ‖Φ(x, w)gε‖L2(0,T ;L2(ΩR))
+ ‖K[gε] +H(w) +D
′(w)‖L∞(0,T ;L∞(ΩR))‖gε‖L2(0,T ;L2(ΩR))(26)
+
(
‖D‖L∞(0,T ;L∞(ΩR)) + 1
)
‖gε‖L2(0,T ;H1(ΩR)) ≤ C,
where C > 0 does not depend on ε and R (since K[gε] is uniformly bounded). Estimates
(25) and (26) allow us to apply the Aubin-Lions lemma to conclude the existence of a
subsequence of (gε), which is not relabeled, such that as ε→ 0,
gε → g strongly in L
2(0, T ;L2(ΩR)),
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gε ⇀ g weakly in L
2(0, T ;H1(ΩR)),
∂tgε ⇀ ∂tg weakly in L
2(0, T ;H−1D (ΩR)).
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, this shows that
‖K[gε]−K[g]‖L2(0,T ;L2(ΩR))
≤
(∫ R
0
∫ ∞
0
Γ(v, w)2dvdw
)∫ T
0
∫ R
0
∫ R
−R
(gε − g)
2(x, w, t)dxdwdt
≤ CΓ‖gε − g‖L2(0,T ;L2(ΩR)) → 0 as ε→ 0.
We infer that
K[gε]gε → K[g]g strongly in L
1(0, T ;L1(ΩR)).
Since (K[gε]gε) is bounded, this convergence holds in L
p for any p <∞. Consequently, we
may perform the limit ε → 0 in (17) (with g+ = g and KM [g] = K[g]) to obtain for all
v ∈ L2(0, T ;H1D(ΩR)),∫ T
0
〈∂tg, v〉 = −
∫ T
0
∫
ΩR
(
(Φx(x, w)g + Φ(x, w)gx)v(27)
+
(
K[g] +H(w) +D′(w)
)
gvw +D(w)gwvw
)
dzdt
Step 5: Limit R→∞. The limit R→∞ is based on Cantor’s diagonal argument. We
have shown that there exists a weak solution gn to (27) with gn(0) = g0 in the sense of
H−1D (Ωn), where n ∈ N. In particular, (gn) is bounded in L
2(0, T ;H1(Ωm)) for all n ≥ m.
We can extract a subsequence (gn,m) of (gn) that converges weakly in L
2(0, T ;H1(Ωm)) to
some g(m) as n→∞. Observing that the estimates in Step 4 are independent of R = n, we
obtain even the strong convergence gn,m → g
(m) in L2(0, T ;L2(Ωm)) and a.e. in Ωm×(0, T ).
This yields the diagonal scheme
g1,1, g2,1, g3,1, . . . → g
(1) = u|Ω1×(0,T ),
g2,2, g3,2, . . . → g
(2) = u|Ω2×(0,T ),
g3,3, . . . → g
(3) = u|Ω3×(0,T ),
. . .
...
This means that there exists a subsequence (gn,1) of (gn) that converges strongly in
L2(0, T ;H1(Ω1)) to some g
(1). From this subsequence, we can select a subsequence (gn,2)
that converges strongly in L2(0, T ;H1(Ω1)) to some g
(2) such that g(2)|Ω1×(0,T ) = g
(1), etc.
The diagonal sequence (gn,n) converges to some g ∈ L
2(0, T ;H1(Ω)) which is a solution to
(2)-(3). 
3.2. Asymptotic behavior of the moments. We analyze the time evolution of the
macroscopic moments
mw(g) =
∫
Ω
g(x, w, t)wdz, mx(g) =
∫
Ω
g(x, w, t)xdz,
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where g is a (smooth) solution to (2)-(3), in the special situation that P = 1 and Φ(x, w)
is given by (8). Observe that P = 1 implies that (recall (10))
H(w) = w −W, where W =
∫ ∞
0
ωM(ω)dω.
The parameterW may be the same as in the definition of Φ(x, w) in (8). First, we compute
∂tmw(g). Using g = 0 at w = 0 and integrating by parts with respect to w, we obtain
∂tmw(g) = −
∫
Ω
(
K[g]g +H(w)g
)
dz ≤ −
∫
Ω
(w −W )gdz = −mw(g) +Wρ,
where we have taken into account that K[g] ≥ 0 and ρ =
∫
Ω
gdz. By Gronwall’s lemma,
mw(g(t)) converges exponentially fast to the mean value ρW as t → ∞. This result is
similar to the convergence of the mean asset value for solutions to the Boltzmann equation,
as shown in Section 2.2.
Next, we compute ∂tmx(g). Then
∂tmx(g) =
∫
R
Φ(x, w)gdw = −δκ
∫
R
∫
{|w−W |<R
gdwdx+ κ
∫
R
∫
{|w−W |≥R
gdwdx.
This expression explains the role of the parameter δ. Indeed, assume that in some time
interval, the number of agents with estimated asset value around W (|w −W | < R) is of
the same order as those with asset value which differs significantly from W (|w−W | ≥ R).
Then, for δ ≫ 1, the mean rationality is decreasing, and if δ ≪ 1, it is increasing. Thus, δ
is a measure for the expected mean rationality.
The variance of g with respect to w is given by Vw(g) =
∫
Ω
g(w −W )2dz. We compute
∂tVw(g) = −2
∫
Ω
(K[g] +H(w))(w −W )gdz + 2
∫
Ω
D(w)gdz.
At this point, we need some simplifying assumptions. Let Γ(v, w) = Γ0 and D(w) = w.
Then K[g] = Γ0ρ and
∂tVw(g) = −2
∫
Ω
(
Γ0ρ(w −W )g + (w −W )
2g
)
dz + 2
∫
Ω
gwdz
= 2(1− Γ0ρ)mw(g) + 2Γ0ρ
2W − 2Vw(g).
We infer from mw(g(t))→ ρW that the variance Vw(g(t)) converges to 2ρW as t→∞.
4. Numerical simulations
We illustrate the behavior of the solution to the kinetic model derived in Section 2.2 by
numerical simulations.
A KINETIC EQUATION MODELING IRRATIONALITY AND HERDING 17
4.1. The numerical scheme. The kinetic equation (7) is originally posed in the un-
bounded spatial domain (x, w) ∈ R × R+. Numerically, we consider instead a bounded
domain, similarly as for the approximate equation (15) in the existence analysis. For this,
let (x, w) ∈ (−1, 1)× (0, 1). This means that agents with x = −1 are completely irrational
and individuals with x = 1 are completely rational. The maximal possible asset value w
is normalized to one. We choose uniform subdivisions (x0, . . . , xN) for the variable x and
(w0, . . . , wM) for the variable w. We take N = M = 70 in the simulations. The function
f(x, w, tk) is approximated by f
k
ij, where x ∈ (xi, xi+1), w ∈ (wj , wj+1), and tk = k△t,
where △t is the time step size (we choose △t = 10−5).
For the numerical approximation, we make an operator splitting ansatz, i.e., we split the
Boltzmann equation (7) into a collisional part and a drift part. The collisional part
∂tf = QI(f) or ∂tf = QH(f, f)
is numerically solved by using the interaction rules (4) or (5), respectively, and a slightly
modified Bird scheme [6]. First, we describe the choice of the interaction rule. The sto-
chastic process η is a point process with η = ±0.06 with probability 0.5. The total
number of agents is normalized to one. We introduce the number of irrational agents
Iirr(w, t) =
∫ 0
−1
f(x, w, t)dx and the number of rational agents Irat(w, t) =
∫ 1
0
f(x, w, t)dx.
If for fixed (w, t), the majority of the agents is rational (Irat > 0.6), we select the herding
interaction rule (5). If the majority of the market participants is irrational (Irat < 0.4),
we choose the interaction rule (4). In the intermediate case, the choice of the interaction
rule is random. Clearly, this choice could be refined by relating it to the value of the ratio
Irat/Iirr. The pairs of individuals that interact are chosen randomly and at each step all the
agents interact with the background and with another randomly chosen agent, respectively.
After the interaction part, we need to distribute the function f on the grid. The dis-
tribution at w∗ is defined by f(w∗) = f(w) − f(v). Then the part f(w∗) is distributed
proportionally to the neighboring grid points wj and wj+1. In order to avoid that the post-
interaction values become negative, some restriction on the random variables are needed;
we refer to [16, Section 2.1] for details.
At each time step, we solve the transport part
∂tf = (Φ(x, w)f)x
using a flux-limited Lax-Wendroff/upwind scheme. More precisely, let △x = 1/N be the
step size for the rationality variable, and recall that △t = 10−5 is the time step size. The
value f(xi, wj, tk) is approximated by f
k
i for a fixed wj. We recall that the upwind scheme
reads as
fk+1i =
{
fki −
△t
△x
Φ(xi, wj)(f
k
i − f
k
i−1) if Φ(xi, wj) > 0,
fki −
△t
△x
Φ(xi, wj)(f
k
i+1 − f
k
i ) if Φ(xi, wj) ≤ 0,
and the Lax-Wendroff scheme is given by
fk+1i = f
k
i −
△t
2△x
Φ(xi, wj)(f
k
i+1 − f
k
i−1) +
(△t)2
2(△x)2
Φ(xi, wj)
2(fki+1 − 2f
k
i + f
k
i−1).
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The Lax-Wendroff scheme has the advantage that it is of second order, while the first-order
upwind scheme is employed close to discontinuities. The choice of the scheme depends on
the smoothness of the data. In order to measure the smoothness, we compute the ratio
θki of the consecutive differences and introduce a smooth van-Leer limiter function Ψ(θ
k
i ),
defined by
Ψ(θki ) =
|θki |+ θ
k
i
1 + |θki |
, where θki =
fki − f
k
i−1
fki+1 − fi
.
Our final scheme is defined by
fk+1i = f
k
i −
△t
△x
Φ(xi, wj)(F
k
i+1 − F
k
i ), where
F ki =
1
2
(fki−1 − f
k
i )−
1
2
sgn(Φ(xi, wj))
(
1−Ψ(θi)
(
1−
△t
△x
|Φ(xi, wj)|
))
(fki − f
k
i−1).
4.2. Choice of functions and parameters. We still need to specify the functions used
in the simulations. We take τH = τI = 1,
P (|w −W |) = 1, d(w) = 4w(1− w), γ(v, w) = 1{w<v}v(1− w),
and Φ(x, w) is given by (8). The values of the parameters α, β, R, W , δ, and κ are
specified below. With the simple setting P = 1, the interaction rule (4) becomes w∗ =
(1−α)w+αW + ηd(w). This means that α measures the influence of the public source: if
α = 1, the agent adopts the asset value W , being the background value; if α = 0, the agent
is not influenced by the public source. The random variables η is normally distributed with
zero mean and standard deviation 0.06.
The diffusion coefficient d(w) is chosen such that it vanishes at the boundary of the
domain of definition of w, i.e. at w = 0 and w = 1, and that its maximal value is one.
The choice of γ(v, w) is similar to that one in [13, Formula (11)], and we explained its
structure already in Section 2.1. In (6), we have chosen f(w) = 1 − w. This means that
agents do not change their asset value due to herding when w is close to its maximal value.
When the asset value is very low, w ≈ 0, we have w∗ ≈ βv+ η1d(w), and the agent adopts
the value βv.
4.3. Numerical test 1: constant R, constant W . We choose R = 0.025 and W = 0.5.
The aim is to understand the occurence of bubbles and crashes depending on the param-
eters α, β, and κ. We say that a bubble (crash) occurs at time t if the mean asset value
mw(f(t)) is larger than W +R (smaller than W −R). This definition is certainly a strong
simplification. However, there seems to be no commonly accepted scientific definition or
classification of a bubble. Shiller [25, page 2] defines “a speculative bubble as a situation
in which news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads by psycholog-
ical contagion from person to person”. Our definition may be different from the usual
perception of a bubble or crash in real markets.
Figure 1 (left) presents the percentage of bubbles and crashes for different values of α.
More precisely, we count how often the mean asset value is larger than W + R (smaller
than W − R) and how often it lies in the range [W − R,W + R]. The quotient defines
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the percentage of bubbles (crashes). The simulations were performed 200 times and the
mean asset value is then averaged. We observe that bubbles occur more frequently when
α is close to zero. This may be explained by the fact that α represents the reliability of
the public information, and when this quantity is small, the agents do not trust the public
source. If α is close to one, all the market participants rely on the public information. This
means that they assume an asset value close to the “fair” prize W . This corresponds to a
herding behavior, and the herding interaction rule, which tends to higher values, applies,
leading to bubble formation. A market that does neither overestimate nor underestimate
public information leads to the smallest bubble percentage, here with α being around 0.5.
Interestingly, the results vary only slightly with repect to the parameter β.
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Figure 1. Left: Percentage of bubbles (left) and crashes (right) depending
on the choice of α and β. The parameters are R = 0.025,W = 0.5, δ = κ = 1.
The percentage of crashes is depicted in Figure 1 (right). Qualitatively, the percentage
is small for values α not too far from 0.5, but the shape of the curves is more complex than
those for bubbles. For instance, there is a local maximum at α = 0.1 and a local minimum
at α = 0.85. The percentage of crashes is largest for α close to one. Again, the dependence
on the parameter β is very weak.
In the above simulations, we have assumed a constant value for α, i.e., all market partic-
ipants have the same attitude to change their mind when interacting with public sources,
We wish to show that nonconstant values lead to similar conclusions. For this, we generate
α from a normal distribution with standard deviation 0.45 and various means 〈α〉. The
result is shown in Figure 2 for β = 0.25 and β = 0.5. For comparison, the percentages for
constant α and β = 0.05 are also shown. It turns out that the results for nonconstant or
constant α are qualitatively similar which justifies the use of constant α.
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Figure 2. Percentage of bubbles for varying α (β = 0.25) and constant α
(β = 0.5 and β = 0.05).
4.4. Numerical test 2: constant R, time-dependent W (t). Now, we chose R = 0.025
and
W (t) = 0.1 + 0.05
(
sin
t
500△t
+
1
2
exp
t
1500△t
)
, t ≥ 0.
The time evolution of the first moment mw(f(t)) =
∫
Ω1
f(x, w, t)wdz is shown in Figure 3.
We see that the mean asset value stays within the range [W (t)−R,W (t)+R] if α is small
(except for increasing “fair” prices) and it has the tendency to take values larger thanW (t)
if α is large.
Figure 4 illustrates the influence of the parameter δ which describes the strength of the
drift in the region |w−W (t)| < R. The background valueW (t) models a crash: It increases
up to time t = 0.2 then decreases abruptly, and stays constant for t > 0.2. For small values
of δ, the mean asset value decreases slowly while it adapts to W (t) more quickly when δ
is large. Interestingly, we observe a (small) time delay for small δ although the equations
do not contain any delay term. The delay is only caused by the slow drift term. The same
phenomenon can be reproduced for abruptly increasing W (t).
4.5. Numerical test 3: time-dependent R(t). The final numerical test is concerned
with time-dependent bounds R(t). We distinguish the upper and lower bound and accord-
ingly the boundaries w = W (t) + R+(t) and w = W (t) − R−(t). The functions R±(t)
are defined as the Bollinger bands which are volatility bands above and below a moving
average. They are employed in technical chart analysis although its interpretation may be
delicate. The definition reads as
R±(tk) =Mn(tk)± kσ(tk),
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Figure 3. Mean asset value mw(f(t)) versus time t for α = 0.5 (left) and
α = 0.05 (right). The function W (t) is represented by the solid line in
between the dashed lines which represent the functionsW (t)+R andW (t)−
R. The parameters are β = 0.25, R = 0.025, δ = 2, κ = 1.
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Figure 4. Mean asset value mw(f(t)) versus time for δ = 0.01 (left) and
δ = 100 (right) with α = 0.25, β = 0.2, R = 0.025, κ = 1.
where Mn(tk) is the n-period moving average (we take n = 30), k is a factor (usually
k = 2), and σ(tk) is the corrected sample standard deviation,
Mn(tk) =
1
n
n∑
ℓ=1
mw(f(tk−ℓ)), σ(tk) =
(
1
n− 1
n∑
ℓ=1
(
mw(f(tk−ℓ))−Mn(tk−ℓ)
)2)1/2
.
Figure 5 shows the time evolution of the mean asset value and the Bollinger bands for
two different values of α and constant W . One may say that the market is overbought (or
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undersold) when the asset value is close to the upper (or lower) Bollinger band. For small
values of α, the market participants are not much influenced by the public information and
they tend to increase their estimated asset value due to herding.
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Figure 5. Mean asset value mw(f(t)) and Bollinger bands R
±(t) versus
time for α = 0.2 (left) and α = 0.05 (right). The parameters are β = 0.25,
W = 0.5, δ = 1, κ = 1.
The mean asset value and the corresponding Bollinger bands for a discontinuous back-
ground value W (t) is displayed in Figure 6 (left column). We have chosen d(w) = w(1−w)
and η = ±0.06 (upper row) or η = ±0.18 (lower row). The value W (t) abruptly decreases
at time t = 0.2. We are interested in the difference of the upper and lower Bollinger bands,
more precisely in the Bollinger bandwidth B(t) = 100(R+(t) − R−(t))/W (t), measuring
the relative difference between the upper and lower Bollinger bands. According to chart
analysts, falling (increasing) bandwidths reflect decreasing (increasing) volatility. In our
simulation, the jump of W (t) gives rise to a peak of the Bollinger bandwidth at t = 0.2;
see Figure 6 (right column). Another small peak can be observed at t ≈ 0.38 (upper right
figure) when η = ±0.06. For larger values of η (lower right figure), the fluctuations in the
Bollinger bandwidth are larger.
In chart analysis, the bandwidth is employed to identify a band squeeze. When the asset
value leaves the interval [R−, R+], this situation may indicate a change of direction of the
prices. Clearly, this interpretation cannot be directly applied to the present situation. On
the other hand, the Bollinger bands are an additional tool to identify large changes in the
mean asset value, for instance when the background value W (t) is no longer deterministic
but driven by some stochastic process. We leave this generalization for future work.
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